Assessing alcohol industry penetration and government safeguards: the International Alcohol Control Study
Original research
Summary
24 diverse jurisdictions reported high levels of alcohol industry penetration. Specifically, all indicated the presence of transnational alcohol corporations, which have enormous resources to market their products and influence policy both nationally and locally.
Almost two-thirds reported government officials or politicians having held roles in the alcohol industry, suggesting it is common for the industry and decision-makers to have close relationships.
There were also multiple examples of government partnerships or agreements with the alcohol industry as forms of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), as well as government incentives for the alcohol industry during the COVID-19 pandemic.
In contrast, the study found few government safeguards against alcohol industry influence, with only the Philippines reporting policies limiting government interactions with and contributions specifically mentioning the alcohol industry, along with the tobacco and milk industries. There were more examples of policies requiring transparency of engagements, such as in the form of lobbyist registers and ministerial diaries.
What is already known on this topic
- The alcohol industry uses many of the tobacco industry’s strategies to influence policy-making, yet unlike the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, there is no intergovernmental guidance on protecting government policies from alcohol industry influence.
What this study adds
- The researchers documented the presence or absence of 22 indicators of alcohol industry penetration and government safeguards across 24 jurisdictions.
How this study might affect research, practice or policy
- The study revealed high levels of alcohol industry penetration and few government safeguards against alcohol industry influence. Better measures are needed to protect government policies from alcohol industry influence.
More detailed findings
Summary of responses for 22 indicators of alcohol industry penetration and government safeguards
| Indicators | Responses | |||||
| Yes | No | NIA | ||||
| n | % | n | % | n | % | |
| Government ownership of industry | ||||||
| 1. Is any part of the alcohol industry owned by the government? | 12 | 50 | 11 | 46 | 1 | 4 |
| Industry penetration | ||||||
| 2. Do any transnational alcohol corporations have headquarters/offices in your country/jurisdiction/state? | 24 | 100 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 3. Has the government allowed the alcohol industry (national or transnational) to participate in any governmental agencies, committees or working groups involved in alcohol policy formulation, implementation or enforcement (excluding public submissions)? | 11 | 46 | 6 | 25 | 7 | 29 |
| 4. Has the government entered into any partnerships or agreements with the alcohol industry, including corporate social responsibility activities (eg, industry involvement in education and charitable causes)? | 14 | 58 | 5 | 21 | 5 | 21 |
| 5. Have any contributions been accepted (financial or non-financial) from the alcohol industry (eg, sponsorship of events) by the government? | 10 | 42 | 2 | 8 | 12 | 50 |
| 6. Have any contributions been accepted (financial or non-financial) from the alcohol industry (eg, sponsorship of events) by political parties? | 7 | 29 | 2 | 8 | 15 | 63 |
| 7. Have any contributions been accepted (financial or non-financial) from the alcohol industry (eg, sponsorship of events) by politicians? | 6 | 25 | 2 | 8 | 16 | 67 |
| 8. Have any government officials or politicians (former or current) held roles in the alcohol industry (eg, ‘revolving door’ phenomenon)? | 15 | 63 | 2 | 8 | 7 | 29 |
| 9. Has the government granted any incentives, privileges or benefits to the alcohol industry (eg, investments or tax exemptions)? | 13 | 54 | 5 | 21 | 6 | 25 |
| 10 Has the alcohol industry supported or funded any non-governmental organisations, front groups, think tanks or consumer groups (excluding trade associations)? | 12 | 50 | 0 | 0 | 12 | 50 |
| 11. Has the alcohol industry supported or funded any media outlets/media training? | 5 | 21 | 2 | 8 | 17 | 71 |
| 12. Has the alcohol industry supported or funded any research? | 10 | 42 | 1 | 4 | 13 | 54 |
| 13. Has the alcohol industry supported or funded any education (eg, schools, symposia or academic meetings)? | 15 | 63 | 0 | 0 | 9 | 38 |
| 14. Has the alcohol industry supported or funded any scientific advisory boards or science institutes? | 4 | 17 | 2 | 8 | 18 | 75 |
| 15. Has the alcohol industry mounted any legal challenges against health policy, government or opponents? | 9 | 38 | 6 | 25 | 9 | 38 |
| 16. Has the alcohol industry used international trade agreements to attempt to influence alcohol policy? | 11 | 46 | 4 | 17 | 9 | 38 |
| 17. Has the alcohol industry exploited loopholes in legislation or regulation? | 10 | 42 | 1 | 4 | 13 | 54 |
| Government safeguards | ||||||
| 18. Is there any policy that limits government interactions with the alcohol industry? | 1 | 4 | 17 | 71 | 6 | 25 |
| 19. Is there any policy that prohibits contributions (financial or non-financial) from the alcohol industry to the government? | 1 | 4 | 18 | 75 | 5 | 21 |
| 20. Is there any policy that prohibits contributions (financial or non-financial) from the alcohol industry to political parties? | 3 | 13 | 16 | 67 | 5 | 21 |
| 21. Is there any policy that prohibits contributions (financial or non-financial) from the alcohol industry to politicians? | 3 | 13 | 15 | 63 | 6 | 25 |
| 22. Is there any policy that requires the government or politicians to make public any records of its meetings or interactions with the alcohol industry? | 9 | 38 | 10 | 42 | 5 | 21 |
Summary of responses to whether any part of the alcohol industry is owned by the government
| Jurisdiction | Response | Relevant examples |
| Australia | No | |
| Botswana | Yes | Government-owned investment company, Botswana Development Corporation, is a major shareholder of Sechaba Brewery Holdings, which owns alcohol producer Kgalagadi Breweries. |
| Cambodia | No | |
| Canada (Alberta) | Yes | Government agency Alberta Gaming, Liquor and Cannabis holds a monopoly over alcohol wholesale, while alcohol retailers are privately owned. |
| Canada (BC) | Yes | British Columbia Liquor Distribution Branch is a branch of government that maintains a monopoly over alcohol wholesale, and operates one of the province’s largest retailers, BC Liquor. |
| Canada (Ontario) | Yes | Liquor Control Branch Ontario is a government-owned corporation with a near-monopoly over alcohol wholesale and retail in the province. |
| Canada (Quebec) | Yes | Société des alcools du Québec is a government-owned corporation with a monopoly over alcohol wholesale in the province. |
| China | Yes | China’s largest alcohol producers, Kweichow Moutai and Wuliangye Yibin, are state-owned enterprises. |
| Colombia | Yes | Local government departments in Colombia have the exclusive power to produce and import distilled liquors directly or through third parties by prior authorisation. |
| Finland | Yes | Government-owned company Alko holds a monopoly over the off-premise retail sales of beverages containing over 5.5% alcohol in Finland. Another government-owned investment company, Solidium Oy, is a major shareholder of alcohol producer Anora Group. |
| India (Karnataka) | No | |
| Ireland | No | |
| Kenya | Yes | The government’s development finance institution, Kenya Development Corporation, is a major shareholder of alcohol producer Kenya Wine Agencies. |
| Lao PDR | Yes | Lao Brewery, one of the country’s largest alcohol producers, is a joint venture company owned by the Lao government and the transnational corporation Carlsberg Group. |
| Lithuania | No | |
| Nepal | No | |
| Netherlands | No | |
| New Zealand | No | |
| Nigeria | NIA | |
| Norway | Yes | Government-owned company Vinmonopolet maintains a monopoly over the retail sales of beverages containing over 4.7% alcohol in Norway. |
| Philippines | No | |
| Sri Lanka | No | |
| Thailand | No | |
| Vietnam | Yes | Habeco, one of the largest brewers in Vietnam, is owned by the government and has a strategic partnership with the transnational corporation Carlsberg Group. |
Summary of responses by 24 jurisdictions for 5 indicators of alcohol industry penetration
| Jurisdiction | Indicators of alcohol industry penetration | ||||
| Presence of transnational alcohol corporations | Alcohol industry participation in alcohol policy formulation implementation or enforcement | Government partnerships or agreements with alcohol industry | Government granting incentives, privileges or benefits to alcohol industry | Government officials/politicians (former/ current) held roles in the alcohol industry (eg, revolving doors) | |
| Australia | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Botswana | Yes | Yes | Yes | NIA | Yes |
| Cambodia | Yes | No | Yes | NIA | NIA |
| Canada (Alberta) | Yes | NIA | NIA | Yes | NIA |
| Canada (BC) | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Canada (Ontario) | Yes | NIA | NIA | Yes | NIA |
| Canada (Quebec) | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | NIA |
| China | Yes | NIA | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Colombia | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Finland | Yes | No | No | No | Yes |
| India (Karnataka) | Yes | NIA | NIA | NIA | Yes |
| Ireland | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Kenya | Yes | NIA | NIA | No | Yes |
| Lao PDR | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | No |
| Lithuania | Yes | No | No | Yes | No |
| Nepal | Yes | NIA | NIA | NIA | Yes |
| Netherlands | Yes | Yes | No | Yes | Yes |
| New Zealand | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Nigeria | Yes | NIA | Yes | NIA | NIA |
| Norway | Yes | No | No | No | NIA |
| Philippines | Yes | No | Yes | No | NIA |
| Sri Lanka | Yes | No | No | Yes | Yes |
| Thailand | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | Yes |
| Vietnam | Yes | Yes | Yes | NIA | Yes |
Results
Half (50%) reported some part of the alcohol industry being owned by the government. All jurisdictions reported the presence of transnational alcohol corporations, and most (63%) reported senior government officials or politicians having held roles in the alcohol industry, known as ‘revolving doors’.
About half (58%) reported government partnerships or agreements with the alcohol industry, while 54% reported government incentives, privileges or benefits for the alcohol industry.
Just under half (46%) reported the alcohol industry being allowed to participate in governmental groups involved in policy formulation or implementation (ie, beyond public submission processes).
Although missing data were >30%, all positive responses (‘yes’ or ‘no’) reported the alcohol industry supporting or funding non-governmental organisations and other front groups, and the alcohol industry supporting or funding education (eg, schools and symposia).
In contrast, few jurisdictions had government safeguards limiting potential industry influence. Only one jurisdiction (4%; the Philippines) had a policy limiting government interactions with and contributions from the alcohol industry. Another three jurisdictions (13%) had policies limiting financial contributions from the alcohol industry to political parties and politicians. More jurisdictions (38%) reported policies requiring the government or politicians to publish any engagement records with the industry. These policies included public registers of lobbyists and their interactions with government officials (eg, for Australia, Ireland and the four Canadian provinces), diary records of government officials (New Zealand) and legislation allowing public access to government information (Kenya and Norway).
Responses to government ownership of the alcohol industry ranged from government ownership of individual alcohol companies (eg, in Botswana, China, Lao PDR, Kenya and Vietnam), which may reflect industry penetration; to government-controlled alcohol wholesale or retail monopolies (eg, in Canada, Finland and Norway), which aim to reduce harm by removing the private sector’s profit motive. In Colombia, local government departments control the production and import of spirits.
Five of 24 jurisdictions (Australia, British Columbia, Colombia, Ireland and New Zealand) reported the presence of all five indicators on alcohol industry penetration. One jurisdiction (Norway) reported only the presence of transnational alcohol corporations.
Notably, government partnerships or agreements with the alcohol industry were commonly in the form of CSR activities, such as supporting healthcare facilities, alcohol impaired driving campaigns and conservation programmes.
There were multiple examples of government privileges or incentives for the alcohol industry during the COVID-19 pandemic. Examples of revolving doors were also common.
Most jurisdictions (14 of 24) reported no measures that limit industry penetration at all or had no such information available. The Canadian provinces (British Columbia, Ontario and Quebec) reported the most government safeguards overall (three of five indicators), with policies prohibiting contributions from the alcohol industry to political parties and politicians, and policies requiring the government or politicians to publish any records of engagements with the alcohol industry. However, current policies in these Canadian jurisdictions only prohibit political donations from corporations in general and are not specific to the alcohol industry. Only the Philippines reported a policy by the Department of Health prohibiting interactions of the government with the alcohol, tobacco and milk industries, including engagements, projects and activities.
Meaning
The study results highlight the contrast between the considerable extent of alcohol industry penetration and the absence of government safeguards, especially when considered against tobacco control policies. This finding is expected, given the lack of an international framework convention for alcohol. Even in the Philippines, where existing government policy limits interactions with the alcohol industry, a bill encouraging CSR in the private sector was recently approved by the House of Representatives, highlighting the challenges in limiting alcohol industry influence.
Given the similar tactics used by the alcohol and tobacco industries to influence policy-making and the extent of alcohol harm, the researchers suggest that governments use the FCTC as a template for alcohol policies, establishing measures to limit government interactions with the alcohol industry and rejecting any partnerships with the industry, including CSR activities.
The economic impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic may have made governments more vulnerable to alcohol industry influence, as seen in the examples that the study has illustrated. Even in countries that are parties to the FCTC, the tobacco industry similarly exploited the pandemic by persuading governments to accept their political contributions and compromise on tobacco tax policies. This underlines the need for governments to strengthen policies on political contributions (both financial and non-financial), limiting the ability of the alcohol industry to influence the public sector. For example, the Canadian government has set an annual limit on political donations and prohibits donations from corporations and trade unions to political parties and politicians.
The study results suggest that more robust policies are needed to enhance the transparency of any government interactions with the alcohol industry. These may include policies requiring the disclosure of detailed meeting records, political lobbying activities and conflicts of interest for government employees and politicians. To limit revolving doors, stand-down periods for government officials and politicians should also be considered and enforced with meaningful sanctions.
Abstract
Background
The alcohol industry uses many of the tobacco industry’s strategies to influence policy-making, yet unlike the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, there is no intergovernmental guidance on protecting policies from alcohol industry influence.
Systematic assessment of alcohol industry penetration and government safeguards is also lacking.
In this study, researchers aimed to identify the nature and extent of industry penetration in a cross-section of jurisdictions. Using these data, the researchers suggest ways to protect alcohol policies and policy-makers from undue industry influence.
Methods
As part of the International Alcohol Control Study, researchers from 24 jurisdictions documented whether 22 indicators of alcohol industry penetration and government safeguards were present or absent in their location. Several sources of publicly available information were used, such as government or alcohol industry reports, websites, media releases, news articles and research articles.
The researchers summarised the responses quantitatively by indicator and jurisdiction. They also extracted examples of industry penetration and government safeguards.
Results
There were high levels of alcohol industry penetration overall.
Notably, all jurisdictions reported the presence of transnational alcohol corporations, and most (63%) reported government officials or politicians having held industry roles.
There were multiple examples of government partnerships or agreements with the alcohol industry as corporate social responsibility activities, and government incentives for the industry in the early COVID-19 pandemic.
In contrast, government safeguards against alcohol industry influence were limited, with only the Philippines reporting a policy to restrict government interactions with the alcohol industry. It was challenging to obtain publicly available information on multiple indicators of alcohol industry penetration.
Conclusion
Governments need to put in place better measures to protect policies from alcohol industry influence, including restricting interactions and partnerships with the alcohol industry, limiting political contributions and enhancing transparency.
Data collection can be improved by measuring these government safeguards in future studies.