Examining the strategies and tactics of the alcohol industry during the COVID-19 pandemic in Botswana
Research article
Study Background and Aim
The strategies and tactics of the global alcohol industry are well-documented in the research literature. Studies in this area have largely concluded that the alcohol industry is very active in policymaking with the main aim of advancing its commercial interests. Scholars have studied industry strategies such as deliberate intentions to develop and influence policies, in which industry operators promote themselves as “partners” to deal with alcohol harm, lobbying governments and political powers, using corporate social responsibility (CSR) programs to promote visibility and products, and portraying alcohol problems as the fault of the informal market and primarily a problem for a minority of individual heavy alcohol consumers amongst others. There is evidence that some industry players advocate for self-regulation and bring alternative “scientific evidence” that undermine public health. The alcohol industry usually resists national public health-based alcohol policies such as those recommended by the World Health Organization (WHO). Some studies have drawn parallels to the tactics by the tobacco industry, known for framing policy debates and using politicians to influence policies in its favour. What is evident from this scholarship is that, despite many publicity attempts and projects that speak to safety and health concerns, the industry is primarily concerned with its commercial interests. Lesch and McCambridge (2022) argue that the alcohol industry operates by “obstruction through participation”. That is, its involvement in the policymaking arena usually undermines evidence-based strategies that have been proven to reduce alcohol harm. In essence, the industry can be considered an “inducer” of alcohol problems since its activities cause more harm than good. Although most of the studies have been conducted in Western contexts, there is some evidence and grey literature about how this industry targets low- and middle-income countries (LMICs). There is evidence that countries in Asia Pacific, Latin America and Africa are witnessing a significant increase in the alcohol policy influence by the industry players.
The activities of the alcohol industry in the sub-Saharan African region have recently gained attention from alcohol policy scholars, suggesting a steadily increasing involvement and influence in the alcohol policy arena. The industry seems to have deployed similar strategies that it uses in high-income countries (HICs) with ambitions to influence alcohol policy decisions in Africa. These include but are not limited to CSR programs, undermining alcohol-attributable harms, funding research and educational campaigns and partnering with African governments. Furthermore, the industry has taken advantage of the inadquate alcohol laws and regulations in Africa in its ambitions to influence development of alcohol policy issues. Evidence from several African countries such as Nigeria, South Africa, Kenya and Uganda suggests a deliberate expansion of alcohol industry activities that has resulted in alcohol problems.
The industry uses CSR activities, sponsorships and lobbying policymakers to sell its products. For Dumbili, these industry activities ultimately resulted in alcohol-related problems amongst youth in Nigeria. Madden et al. (2024) noted alcohol marketing as a prominent feature in the Ugandan urban slums. They reported that about thirty-five (n = 35) companies, including prominent ones, were actively marketing alcohol in urban slums in Uganda, undermining public health interventions especially amongst poor and vulnerable communities.
The COVID-19 pandemic and its associated restrictions severely affected the global consumption and distribution of alcohol. As the COVID-19 virus spread around the world in the first quarter of 2020, the alcohol industry was affected by measures such as physical distancing, placing limits on the sale and distribution of alcohol as well as the closing down of parts of the alcohol trade. Some African countries completely banned the consumption of alcohol in an effort to reduce the spread of COVID-19. The rationale behind closing down bars and other alcohol sales outlets was that bars were considered high risk areas for spreading the virus.
To ensure its survival amid decreasing profits, the industry not only opposed some of these measures, but also came up with alternative strategies and ‘scientific evidence’ that countered COVID-19 restrictions. Its main contention was that the COVID-19 alcohol regulations negatively affected the economy especially job sustainabilityx. By doing so, the alcohol industry engaged in moral opportunism of economic harm during a crisis situation to serve its vested interests. This strategy undermines public trust in science and endangers evidence-based policy making.
There are many reasons to suspect that the alcohol industry in Botswana opportunistically influenced the government’s response to COVID-19 in an unethical way. This needs to be documented in the context of the Botswana alcohol policy developments: Botswana is known to be one of the few countries in Africa that have implemented strict tax policies to reduce alcohol-related harm. To mitigate against the spread of COVID-19, the government implemented a hard lockdown on March 27, 2020 where movement in and outside the country was restricted except for workers classified as essential services. The sale, distribution and consumption of alcohol was banned for 67 days (March to June 2020) during the first lockdown. The COVID-19 restrictions were complemented by strict enforcement from law enforcement agencies. The banning of alcohol was opposed by alcohol industry actors who cited lack of evidence that alcohol consumption cannot solely be responsible for COVID-19 infections. The industry exercised strategic ignorance arguing that alcohol consumption had not been proven to be a high-risk activity for the spread of the virus. As COVID-19 increasingly became a threat, the industry devised some strategies to cushion itself from the COVID-19 restrictions. An understanding of industry strategies may shed light on the tactics employed by the industry actors even in non-pandemic times in Botswana and other LMICs.
This study aims to fill this knowledge gap by examining the strategies and tactics employed by the alcohol industry during the COVID-19 pandemic in Botswana. The study uses newspaper articles, policy documents and other online sources published in relation to the alcohol industry activities during the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 and 2021.
The Alcohol Industry in Botswana
In Botswana, the alcohol industry’s involvement in policymaking is a relatively recent development. The main alcohol industry operator in Botswana is the Botswana Alcohol Industry Association (BAIA) that was established by Kgalagadi Breweries Limited (Pty) and Botswana Breweries (Pty) Ltd – both are controlled by multinational beer giant Anheuser-Busch InBev, Diageo, Namibia Breweries – owned by multinational beer giant Heineken, Distell Botswana, Global Holdings, Benju and Heineken International in 2010.
The front group pushes for industry interests in policy issues and most of the companies that make up BAIA are subsidiaries of powerful multinational corporations who have a massive global footprint. For example, Anheuseur-Busch InBev and SABMiller merged in 2016 and has almost 30% share of the total global industry market.
Although there may have been earlier activities, the alcohol industry rose to more prominence as a policy stakeholder after 2008, when the government of Botswana introduced a series of reforms aimed at reducing alcohol harm. These reforms included a 30% alcohol tax levy, outlawing alcohol sales in residences, reducing hours of operation for bars and other licensed premises, and increasing penalties for driving under the influence of alcohol amongst others. These measures were modelled on international “best practice” with reference to evidence and recommendations such as the WHO’s “best buy package”. Industry actors in Botswana opposed the measures. For example, BAIA threatened to take government to court if they further increased the alcohol tax levy.
Over the years, BAIA has increasingly become vocal about alcohol policy issues in Botswana. BAIA has not only used various media platforms to condemn government policy and measures that seek to regulate alcohol in Botswana, but also came up with various activities to promote its visibility. For example, in 2012, BAIA piloted an alcohol behaviour change program in the central part of Botswana that encouraged youth to resist the temptations of early age alcohol use. The program did not directly market BAIA’s products but it served the industry’s interests by framing youth alcohol use as responsibility of parents and teachers. In doing so, the campaign absolved structural circumstances and the industry itself from any alcohol harm. BAIA continues to engage in partnerships and community-based activities to increase its visibility in the Botswana public sphere.
During the COVID-19-induced ban on the sale and distribution of alcohol, BAIA was the biggest critic of the alcohol regulation measures. The front group regularly held media campaigns to dispute the link between alcohol consumption and the spread of COVID-19.
Key Findings
The study identified five main strategic framings employed by the alcohol industry:
- focus on individual alcohol consumption behaviour,
- CSR as a “good” deed,
- minimising alcohol’s role in COVID harm,
- treating the Botswana government as a “strategic partner’, and
- employing legal actions or threats of litigation.
Strategic Frame 1: Individual Responsibility Framing
The Botswana Alcohol Industry Association (BAIA) consistently framed alcohol consumption during the COVID-19 pandemic as a matter of individual responsibility, drawing on a well-documented alcohol industry discourse that shifts attention away from structural and supply-side determinants of alcohol harm. This framing aligns with established industry strategies that emphasise “responsible drinking” and personal self-control, often leaving the concept undefined and unexamined.
During lockdowns, BAIA engaged in social norming alcohol consumption and publicly promoted the idea that people could and should continue alcohol consumption at home, presenting this as culturally appropriate and compatible with public health measures. Media statements by BAIA representatives explicitly positioned alcohol use behaviour as an individual choice. In doing so, BAIA redirected responsibility for COVID-19 risks away from alcohol availability and industry practices, and toward individual conduct.
Across newspaper coverage and COVID-19 task force policy discussions, BAIA repeatedly argued that alcohol problems affected only a small minority and that alcohol regulation measures unfairly penalised the majority of “responsible” alcohol users. This narrative underpinned BAIA’s opposition to the temporary alcohol sales bans and was reinforced through frequent press briefings disputing public health measures. By framing alcohol harms as exceptional and individualised, BAIA marginalised population-level evidence and avoided scrutiny of alcohol supply, marketing, and regulatory policy.
Overall, BAIA’s individual responsibility framing functioned to normalise alcohol consumption during the pandemic, legitimise continued sales, and deflect attention from structural drivers of harm. The study finds this strategy was systematically deployed through media engagement and policy discourse, effectively embedding individualism at the centre of the public narrative while sidelining evidence-based population health approaches.
Strategic Frame 2: Corporate Social Responsibility as “Doing Good”
During the COVID-19 pandemic, the Botswana Alcohol Industry Association (BAIA) strategically framed its corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities as acts of public good, using them to enhance visibility and reinforce its “responsible drinking” narrative. CSR initiatives were consistently accompanied by messaging emphasising individual responsibility, thereby aligning charitable activities with industry-preferred framings of alcohol use and harm.
BAIA’s CSR efforts primarily took the form of donations to law enforcement and essential service workers operating during lockdowns, including personal protective equipment such as masks, hand sanitisers, and educational materials. These actions were publicly communicated as support for government COVID-19 response efforts and as a means to encourage adherence to health protocols and “responsible drinking” at home. Through such activities, BAIA positioned itself as a socially responsible partner, extending its perceived societal role beyond alcohol production and sales.
The study finds that communication around these CSR activities served to project a caring and cooperative image of the alcohol industry, likely aimed at strengthening brand legitimacy and safeguarding commercial interests, consistent with findings from other contexts. Reports highlighted donations, educational campaigns, and collaborations with government ministries and law enforcement agencies, further embedding BAIA within official response structures.
Overall, CSR was framed as altruistic public service during a national crisis. However, the study concludes that these activities functioned primarily as reputational tools that complemented industry narratives on individual “responsibility”, while deflecting attention from alcohol harms and preserving the industry’s political and commercial standing.
Strategic Frame 3: Minimising Alcohol’s Role in COVID-19 Harms
The third strategy employed by the Botswana Alcohol Industry Association (BAIA) during the COVID-19 pandemic was to minimise the role of alcohol in the spread of COVID-19 infections, positioning the industry as “unfairly” targeted. This framing overlapped with both individual responsibility narratives and CSR messaging, and was primarily advanced through media statements and public campaigns.
BAIA repeatedly contested government claims linking alcohol availability to rising COVID-19 cases, arguing that alcohol was being singled out while other economic sectors continued operating. Industry representatives characterised this as unjust scapegoating, portraying the alcohol sector as a victim of “disproportionate” and “punitive” regulation rather than a contributor to public health risk. This victimhood framing reframed public health measures as politically motivated attacks on the industry, rather than evidence-based interventions.
Downplaying alcohol harm was further evident in BAIA’s selective use of statistics. For example, public statements cited alcohol-related traffic offences as constituting less than 3% over a ten-year period, without clarifying definitions, scope, or real-world implications. Such figures were presented without context, creating the impression of minimal harm while obscuring the potential scale and severity of alcohol-related impacts. These claims were frequently coupled with references to the industry’s purported social contributions and “good deeds.”
Economic framing formed a central component of this strategy. BAIA emphasised employment figures and the economic importance of the alcohol sector, arguing that alcohol bans threatened livelihoods and would exacerbate unemployment and poverty. Statements highlighted direct and indirect employment numbers to suggest that public health measures needed to be balanced against economic survival, particularly for poorer citizens dependent on alcohol-related value chains.
Overall, the study finds that BAIA systematically minimised alcohol’s contribution to COVID-19 harms by deflecting attention away from supply-side factors and reframing the industry as a victim of government overreach. This strategy was not deployed in isolation but was frequently combined with individual responsibility and CSR narratives, reinforcing industry efforts to protect commercial interests while undermining population-level public health approaches.
Strategic Frame 4: Positioning Government as a “Strategic Partner”
A fourth strategy identified in the study concerns the alcohol industry’s deliberate framing of the Botswana government as a “strategic partner”, enabling the Botswana Alcohol Industry Association (BAIA) to advance its commercial interests through institutional proximity and policy influence. Such partnership-seeking and lobbying practices are well documented in alcohol industry research.
This strategy was most clearly demonstrated during the COVID-19 pandemic in September 2020, when alcohol sales were temporarily banned for nearly six weeks at the height of infections. Despite these measures, BAIA partnered with the Botswana government to launch the #DiNweleDladleng (“Drink at home”) campaign, which actively encouraged the purchase and consumption of alcohol in private settings. Campaign materials used culturally resonant frames, including references to popular Setswana games, to promote alcohol use under lockdown conditions.
The study highlights that this partnership effectively undermined the government’s own public health messaging. At the same time that the COVID-19 taskforce publicly condemned “DiChillas” – informal private alcohol consumption gatherings that violated health protocols – the government co-endorsed a campaign that legitimised alcohol consumption at home, thereby normalising precisely the behaviours it sought to discourage. This illustrates the alcohol industry’s capacity to influence policy actors and redirect public attention, even during a public health emergency.
Throughout the campaign, BAIA maintained consistent framing that responsibility for alcohol consumption rested solely with individual consumers. Structural risks linked with home alcohol use – such as increased domestic violence and children’s exposure to alcohol – were absent from campaign messaging, despite established evidence of these harms. By promoting alcohol use through a government-endorsed initiative while sidestepping these risks, BAIA further detached alcohol consumption from social responsibility and regulatory accountability.
Overall, the study concludes that framing the government as a “strategic partner” allowed BAIA to embed industry narratives within official public health responses, deflect attention from alcohol-related harms, and exploit institutional vulnerabilities to protect its commercial interests.
Strategic Frame 5: Legal Action and Threats of Litigation
The fifth strategy identified in the study concerns the alcohol industry’s use of legal action and threats of litigation to challenge alcohol policy measures that threaten its commercial interests. Litigation functioned as a means to reframe public health policy debates in economic and legal terms, while contesting the evidentiary basis for government action. This strategy was evident during the COVID-19 pandemic but reflects a longer-standing industry practice in Botswana, including earlier threats of legal action in response to the introduction of the alcohol levy in 2008.
During the COVID-19 crisis, industry opposition escalated into formal legal proceedings. In July 2021, Kgalagadi Breweries Limited (KBL), a member of the Botswana Alcohol Industry Association (BAIA) and controled by AB InBev, filed a court challenge against the government’s decision to temporarily ban alcohol sales at the height of rising COVID-19 infections linked to non-adherence to public health protocols. In its legal submissions, KBL framed the ban as economically damaging, arguing that it threatened jobs and livelihoods dependent on alcohol sales, while denying a causal link between alcohol availability and increased COVID-19 transmission.
KBL’s court filings asserted that the alcohol ban lacked clear and objective evidence demonstrating its effectiveness in reducing COVID-19 cases. The court ultimately dismissed the case, awarding costs against KBL and allowing the ban to remain in force. Despite this outcome, the case illustrates how legal challenges are deployed as a strategic tool to delay, contest, or dilute public health measures.
Overall, the study concludes that litigation and the threat of litigation constitute a recurring industry strategy to protect corporate interests at the expense of public welfare. Such legal actions consistently emphasise economic harm and employment concerns while omitting or downplaying evidence on alcohol harms, mirroring broader patterns documented in the alcohol policy literature.
Key Insights and Meaning
This study demonstrates that the alcohol industry in Botswana was not a passive stakeholder during the COVID-19 pandemic but an active political actor that strategically intervened against public health oriented alcohol policymaking to protect its commercial interests. Since consolidating into a powerful industry association after 2008, the industry has mobilised significant resources to shape policy debates and public narratives, a dynamic that became particularly visible during the pandemic.
The analysis identifies five interlinked strategic frames which the alcohol industry deployed simultaneously and in complementary ways. Together, these strategies worked to undermine health promotion measures by portraying the industry as socially responsible, economically indispensable, and unfairly targeted, while repositioning alcohol consumption as a matter of individual choice rather than a public health and regulatory issue. The underlying rationale across all framings was consistent: to defend the industry’s public image and commercial interests by downplaying alcohol’s contribution to COVID-19 harms.
The findings highlight how alcohol industry interference is facilitated in low- and middle-income country (LMIC) contexts by less developed and often inadequate regulatory frameworks, limited institutional experience with alcohol policy, and constrained public health advocacy capacity. In Botswana, BAIA deployed tactics well established in global alcohol industry playbooks, exploiting both regulatory gaps and the exceptional conditions of a public health crisis to position itself as a responsible societal partner rather than a regulated commercial actor. CSR donations, government “partnerships,” and economic framing were particularly effective in embedding industry narratives within official response structures.
A central insight concerns the industry’s reliance on individual responsibility framing, rooted in neoliberal narratives about personal choice and self-control. By promoting vague notions of “responsible drinking,” the industry shifted risk and blame onto individuals while obscuring structural drivers of alcohol harm, including poverty, inequality, availability, and marketing. This framing absolved the industry of responsibility for alcohol harm and diverted attention away from supply-side regulation, consistent with patterns observed in other countries during COVID-19.
The study further shows that when regulatory measures directly threatened commercial interests, the industry escalated its response through litigation and legal threats, reframing public health interventions as economically harmful and evidentially unjustified. These tactics mirror strategies documented in Botswana’s earlier alcohol policy debates and in comparable settings such as South Africa, reinforcing the conclusion that industry interference is systematic rather than context-specific.
Overall, the study contributes to the growing evidence that alcohol industry involvement in policymaking – particularly during crises – poses a significant risk to effective public health action. It underscores the need for more robust and comprehensive safeguards against conflicts of interest, greater industry literacy among government actors, and more robust public health and civil society engagement to counter industry interference, especially in settings where alcohol policy systems remain under development.
Key Lessons from the Botswana Alcohol Industry Interference Case
- Alcohol industry interference is strategic, adaptive, and crisis-responsive. The Botswana case shows that when alcohol availability was regualted during COVID-19, the industry rapidly mobilised multiple, coordinated frames – individual responsibility, CSR, harm minimisation, and government partnerships – to oppose government action and protect their commercial interests. These tactics undermined public health measures and redirected attention away from alcohol harm.
- Government inexperience creates vulnerability to industry influence. The industry exploited gaps in institutional experience and awareness of alcohol industry tactics. This highlights the importance of equipping policymakers with a clear understanding of how alcohol industry interference operates, particularly during emergencies when policy decisions are made under pressure.
- Industry “partnerships” can contradict and undermine public health policy. The #DiNweleDladeng campaign illustrates how collaboration with government can normalise alcohol consumption in ways that conflict with public health objectives, including COVID-19 protocols. Such partnerships risk embedding industry narratives within official responses and diluting regulatory intent.
- Independent evidence is essential for effective alcohol policy. The study underscores the need for governments to rely on an evidence base free from alcohol industry interference. Without independent research and public health expertise, policy development in LMICs remains highly susceptible to industry framing and selective use of data.
- Public health expertise and civil society engagement are critical counterweights. Strong involvement of alcohol researchers, public health professionals, and civil society organisations is necessary to support evidence-based policymaking and resist industry interference. Their absence leaves governments exposed to well-resourced commercial actors.
- Political leadership and policy continuity matter. Effective alcohol policy requires sustained political will and continuity across political administrations. Frequent policy reversals, as seen in Botswana, weaken regulatory effectiveness and create openings for industry influence.
- Regional and international cooperation strengthens national policy resilience. Given that the tactics observed in Botswana mirror global alcohol industry strategies, regional and international collaboration can help policymakers anticipate, recognise, and counter industry interference more effectively.
Abstract
Aim
To examine the strategies and tactics of the alcohol industry during the COVID-19 pandemic in Botswana, a time when the country implemented a hard lockdown with strict restrictions on the sale, distribution and consumption of alcohol.
Methods
A qualitative content analysis was conducted of newspaper articles (n = 11), policy documents (n = 2) and other online sources (n = 2) published between 2020 and 2021.
Results
The study shows that the alcohol industry was actively involved in influencing alcohol policy during the COVID-19 pandemic in Botswana. It mainly employed five main strategic framings, emphasising individual alcohol consumption behaviour, corporate social responsibility as a “good” deed, downplaying alcohol’s role in COVID harm, treating the Botswana government as a “strategic partner” and using legal action to influence policy towards commercial interests to contradict public health protocols.
Conclusions
The activities by the alcohol industry during COVID-19 provide insight into the increasing influence that industry actors have in Botswana policy-making. The studied strategies undermine public health interventions, demonstrating the urgent need to determine how this business sector impacts health interventions in low- and middle-income countries.